

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: DRAFTING GROUP MEETING, NO. 202, MARCH 28, 1978
(SALT TWO-1668)

SUMMARY: SOVIETS RESTATED CLAIMS THAT U.S. DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH AGREEMENT ALREADY REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THAT POSSIBLE COMBAT USE OF CMS NOT SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION IN DRAFTING GROUP. U.S. MAINTAINED THAT CRUISE MISSILES MUST BE DEFINED IN TERMS OF CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY ARE TO BE USED. SOVIETS ALLEGED U.S. DEFINITION OF RANGE WOULD PERMIT 600 KM CM TO FLY 5000 KM. U.S. DENIED IT HAD EVER ADVANCED SUCH A VIEW. END SUMMARY.

1. KARPOV REITERATED PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS THAT U.S.-PROPOSED CRUISE MISSILE DEFINITION WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH RANGE LIMITATIONS AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, I.E., 600 AND 2500 KM. HE SAID SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO SEEK MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DEFINITION OF CRUISE MISSILE RANGE BUT DISTANCE AT WHICH MISSILE CAN EFFECTIVELY ENGAGE TARGET IS NOT QUESTION FOR DISCUSSION BY DRAFTING GROUP. ITS TASK

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IS TO LIMIT RANGE OF CRUISE MISSILES. COMBAT USE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CRUISE MISSILES NOT PROPER SUBJECT TO DISCUSS AND SOVIET SIDE WILL NOT DO SO.

2. SOVIET PROPOSAL DEFINES CM RANGE AS MAXIMUM DISTANCE MISSILE CAN COVER IN STANDARD DESIGN MODE, DETERMINED BY

PROJECTING ITS FLIGHT PATH ON EARTH'S SURFACE. THEY DO NOT INSIST THAT CM MUST FLY STRAIGHT LINE. CM MAY MANEUVER, EITHER VERTICALLY OR HORIZONTALLY, BUT SUCH MANEUVERS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND MAXIMUM DISTANCE IT CAN COVER IN STANDARD DESIGN MODE SHOULD NOT EXCEED 600 OR 2500 KM RESPECTIVELY. U.S. DEFINITION BLURS LIMITS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND SOVIET SIDE CANNOT AGREE TO THAT.

3. PEREZ POINTED OUT THAT U.S. DEFINITION IS CLEARLY BASED ON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY OF CRUISE MISSILE SYSTEM. SOVIETS HAVE IN RECENT WEEKS REFUSED TO DISCUSS "OPERATIONAL USE" OR "OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES". KARPOV COMMENTED THAT ENGLISH WORD "OPERATIONAL" IS USED IN TWO SENSES. ART. VI SPEAKS OF ARMS WHICH ARE OPERATIONAL. HOWEVER, WHEN ONE SPEAKS OF "OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES" THAT SIGNIFIED THE USE OF THESE SYSTEMS IN REAL CONDITIONS OF WAR. THAT QUESTION HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN TO THE DRAFTING GROUP. ITS TASK IS TO LIMIT ARMS AND REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF WAR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR. HYPOTHETICAL WARS, SUCH AS ENVISAGED IN THE U.S. DEFINITION, ARE NOT AT ISSUE.

4. PEREZ REPLIED THAT U.S. MEANS BY TERM "OPERATIONAL USE" CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH SYSTEMS ARE TO BE USED. TESTING OF THESE SYSTEMS MUST BE COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR PROSPECTIVE
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USE. SOVIET STATEMENTS CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS CERTAIN LACK OF WILLINGNESS ON SOVIET PART TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO U.S. PROPOSAL. KARPOV DENIED THIS, CONTENDING THAT SOVIETS HAD COME TO THEIR CONCLUSION AFTER SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF U.S. PROPOSALS. THIS WAS NOW SOVIET POSITION AND COULD BE REPEATED AS OFTEN AS U.S. SIDE WISHED. U.S. PROPOSAL BLURS LIMITS ESTABLISHED BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS AND BRINGS ENTIRE LIMITATION ON TO COMPLETELY INCOMPREHENSIBLE MARSHY GROUND. U.S. SAYS IT CAN ACCEPT 600 KM LIMIT BUT THEN EXTENDS IT TO MEAN 5000 KM. MCNEILL POINTED OUT THAT U.S. SIDE HAS NEVER SAID THAT 600 KM LIMIT COULD MEAN AS MUCH AS 5000 OR MENTIONED ANY OTHER FIGURE. SIDES AGREED TO RETURN TO SUBJECT LATER.

5. PEREZ REMINDED SOVIETS THAT U.S. HAD MADE PLENARY STATEMENT LAST WEEK ABOUT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE XVI AND WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING SOVIET REACTION. KARPOV PROMISED TO RETURN TO THIS ITEM ALSO.

6. NEXT MEETING SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY, MARCH 31.

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